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THE PER SE CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULE
APPLIED TO SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS
GENERAL SERVING AS DEFENSE COUNSEL-
PEOPLE v. FIFE
All criminal defendants enjoy the sixth amendment right to effective assist-
ance of counsel,' which requires that services of the defense attorney be
devoted entirely to the defendant unimpeded by a conflict of interest. 2 To
1. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "It has
long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970). See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90
(1955) (the effective assistance of counsel is a constitutional right that no state may disregard);
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to
consult with the accused and prepare his defense could turn the requirement of counsel into a
sham. The guarantee of the assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appoint-
ment); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (in the "Scottsboro boys" case the Court
reversed the rape convictions of six illiterate black youths because counsel's mere "pro forma"
appearance in so hostile a setting did not satisfy the requirements of the right to counsel "in any
substantial sense"). See generally, Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 1077 (1973); Hails & Savage, Effective Assistance of Counsel: A Farce and a Sham?, 5
ORANGE COUNTY B.J. 7 (1978); Note, Criminal Procedure-Constitutional Law-Effective As-
sistance of Counsel and Right to a Fair Trial, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 913 (1976).
2. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942). In Glasser, the trial judge ordered
Glasser's attorney to simultaneously represent a co-defendant whose interests conflicted with
Glasser's. The order came despite an objection by Glasser that a conflict of interest would arise
in the joint representation. The Supreme Court found that Glasser's right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel had been denied and reversed the conviction. Id. at 76.
Glasser has been the object of conflicting interpretations upon the issue of whether a finding
of prejudice as well as a conflict of interest is required to sustain a violation of the right to
counsel. See generally Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of In-
terest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119
(1978). At one point, the Court said that "[tio determine the precise degree of prejudice . . . is
at once difficult and unnecessary." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 75-76. Yet, the Court
presented a detailed analysis of the actual prejudice Glasser sustained, specifically the attorney's
inadequate cross-examination of a key witness, and concluded that the representation was "not
as effective as it might have been if the appointment had not been made." Id. at 76. The
Supreme Court has recently interpreted Glasser to require reversal without a showing of prej-
udice when a trial judge has improperly ordered joint representation over a timely objection.
See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978).
Some courts maintain that a conflict of interest in defense counsel is so conducive to divided
loyalty that the mere existence of the conflict is sufficient to deny the right to the effective
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 63 (1979) (where retained counsel represented prosecuting attorney in unrelated civil mat-
ter, trial was fundamentally unfair); United States v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 210 (3rd Cir.
1973) (joint representation will be constitutionally defective upon a showing of a possible conflict
of interest or prejudice however remote); Commonwealth v. Leslie, 382 N.E.2d 1072, 1075
(Mass. 1978) (prejudice will be presumed when a "genuine" conflict of interest exists); Harrison
v. State, 552 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. Crim. 1977) (prejudice will be presumed when a conflict of
interest is found in appointed counsel); State v. Aguilar, 87 N.M. 503, 504, 536 P.2d 263, 264
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salleguard this right, Illinois has employed a per se conflict of interest rule
that does not require a showing of prejudice when a def'ense counsel's actual
commitments to others might restrain the attorney's efforts. . Recently, in
People v. Fife 4 the Illinois Supreme Court applied the per se rule to special
assistant attorneys general who serve as criminal defense counsel. 6
In Fife, the court held that a conflict of interest exists when defense coun-
sel is a special assistant attorney general, and his or her client is not
adequately informed of the relationship with the Attorney General and thus
does not make a knowing and eflective waiver of the right to counsel free of
the conflict. 7 This conflict exists even though the attorney is limited to
(1975) (prejudice will be presumed when victim is defense counsel's civil client). Other courts
require a showing of prejudice before they will conclude that a conflict of interest has denied
the defendant the effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g. , United States v. DeFillipio, 590
F.2d 1228, 1237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2844 (1979) (unless actual prejudice is shown,
joint representation is permissible); Smith v. Regan, 583 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1978) (Glasser pre-
sumption applies only if timely objection was made); People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684,
720, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894, 915 (1978) (requirement of actual prejudice is the majority rule). The
Supreme Court will have an opportunity to resolve this conflict when it reviews United States
v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979). Cuyler is a multiple
representation case in which the court reversed defendant's conviction because the record dem-
onstrated the possibility of a conflict of interest. Id. at 521.
3. See generally Ehrmann, The Per Se Conflict of Interest Rule in Illinois, 66 ILL. B.J. 578
(1978). See notes 14-39 and accompanying text infra.
4. 76 111. 2d 418, 392 N.E.2d 1345 (1979).
5. The Attorney General is the legal officer of the state with his or her duties prescribed
by law. ILL. CONST. art. 5, § 15. They include: the duty to appear for the state before the
supreme court, defend proceedings against a state officer, give written opinions to the general
assembly, prosecute corporations for failing to make reports required by law, and assist the
state's attorney in the prosecution of a criminal case if, in the Attorney General's judgment, the
interests of the. state require it. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 4 (1977).
To efficiently discharge this wide variety of duties the Attorney General has sought the aid of
local attorneys. They are appointed special assistants with authority limited to particular types of
litigation. If the attorney is limited to non-criminal matters, the special assistant owes no duty to
the Attorney General in criminal cases. People v. Crawford Distrib. Co., 65 111. App. 3d 790,
795, 382 N.E.2d 1223, 1228 (4th Dist. 1978), aff'd, 78 II1. 2d 70, 397 N.E.2d 1362 (1979). Some
special assistants receive a monthly retainer fee. Others are paid by voucher for services ren-
dered on a part time basis. Others are regularly employed by another state agency and are
appointed special assistants for certain types of litigation. Appendix, Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant
at 1, People v. Fife, 76 II. 2d 418, 392 N.E.2d 1345 (1979).
6. The Attorney General's 1969 Code of Conduct flatly prohibited staff members from en-
gaging in criminal defense work, but this policy was relaxed as to part-time staff in the 1978
revision of the code. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 2. Under the current code, special
assistants may represent criminal defendants with the Attorney General's permission. A pre-
requisite for obtaining this permission is disclosure to the client of the status as special assistant
and client's written waiver of any possible conflict of interest. Attorney General's Code of Con-
duct at 5-6 (revised 1978). Criminal defense work by special assistant attorneys general is likely
to be common in small downstate counties, because special assistants often form a large percen-
tage of the local bar. See note 78 infra.
7. 76 I11. 2d at 424, 392 N.E.2d at 1348. The court explained that the problem is "nullified
or significantly lessened" by waiver. Id. at 425, 392 N.E.2d at 1348.
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handling non-criminal matters for the state. S The court held that this con-
flict of interest denies the defendant the effective assistance of counsel ab-
sent the requisite showing that the conflict was prejudicial to the defense. 9
The holding also applies when another attorney in defense counsel's firm is a
special assistant. 10
Further, the Fife decision settles a dispute among appellate districts on
the issue of special assistants. 11 The acute nature of the disagreement
within the appellate bench is evidenced by the fact that one district decided
the issue both ways on the same day. 12 Although the court in Fife found a
sixth amendment violation when special assistants do criminal defense work,
those in prior appellate cases who unsuccessfully challenged their convictions
on this ground cannot claim the benefit of the Fife rule. The court held that
its per se rule would not apply to pending cases but would operate prospec-
tively to criminal cases occurring after the filing of the Fife opinion. 13
The purpose of this Note is to analyze Fife in light of former Illinois Su-
preme Court cases employing the per se rule. The Note will demonstrate
that the court's position on waiver and its decision to deny retroactive effect
to its holding are inconsistent with the rationale underlying the per se rule.
The likely impact of Fife upon the Attorney General's office in particular and
defense attorneys in general also will be considered. Finally, an alternative
non-constitutional approach, free of the inconsistencies in the court's reason-
ing, will be suggested.
BACKGROUND: THE PER SE RULE
The per se conflict of interest rule provides that if a defense attorney's
actual commitments to others might restrain the attorney in fully represent-
8. Id. at 424, 392 N.E.2d at 1348.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 425, 392 N.E.2d at [348.
11. The first appellate district held that representation of a criminal defendant by a special
assistant constituted a per se conflict of interest in People v. Pendleton, 52 111. App. 3d 241, 367
N.E.2d 196. (1st Dist. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956 (1978). The fourth appellate district
was split on the issue. See note 12 infra.
12. Compare the appellate decision in People v. Fife, 65 I11. App. 3d 805, 382 N.E.2d 1234
(4th Dist. 1978), aff'd, 76 I11. 2d 418, 392 N.E.2d 1345 (1979) (court found a per se conflict)
with People v. Crawford Distrib. Co., 65 Ill. App. 3d 790, 382 N.E.2d 1223 (4th Dist. 1978),
aff'd, 78 III. 2d 70, 397 N.E.2d 1362 (1979) (defense counsel worked for firms with members
serving as special assistant attorneys general in public aid and condemnation cases) and People
v. Rogers, 64 I11. App. 3d 290, 382 N.E.2d 1236 (4th Dist. 1978), aff'd, No. 51421 (II1. an-
nounced June, 1979) (defense counsel was a special assistant limited to workmen's compensation
cases). Both Crawford and Rogers held that there was no conflict of interest when special
assistants assumed criminal defense responsibilities. Fife, Crawford, and Rogers were decided
by different panels of fourth district justices on Sept. 29, 1978. The same court previously found
a per se conflict under almost identical facts in People v. Cross, 30 Ill. App. 3d 119, 331
N.E.2d 643 :4th Dist. 1975) (defense counsel was a special assistant limited to inheritance tax
work), but Cross was overruled in Crawford, 65 Ill. App. 3d at 796, 382 N.E.2d at 1228.
13. 76 Ill. 2d at 425, 392 N.E.2d at 1348-49. The opinion was filed June 8, 1979.
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ing the defendant's interests, then a court will not demand a showing of
prejudice to sustain a finding that the accused was denied the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 14 The principle underlying the rule is that the
"right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to
allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice
arising out of its denial. " 5  The rule focuses primarily on counsel's actual
commitments rather than solely upon monetary interests because the com-
mitment approach is considered both more workable and more closely re-
lated to the conflicts likely to arise in everyday practice. 16
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the per se rule in People v. Stoval, 17
in which the court reversed the defendant's conviction for burglarizing a
jewelry store. At trial, Stoval's appointed counsel was a member of' a law
firm representing the store and its owner. Under these circumstances, the
court concluded that Stoval's right to counsel had been denied because he
had been deprived of' his counsel's "undivided loyalty. '' 1 The court
explained that a defense attorney who also represents the victim naturall]\
will be reluctant to jeopardize the future business of' a paying client by a
vigorous defense. 19 Further, a forceful defense could require the attorney
to investigate, cross-examine, and impeach his or her own client. 20 The
14. People v. Berland, 74 111. 2d 286, 303-04, 385 N.E.2d 649, 657 (1978) (multiple rep-
resentation case where court reviewed history of the per se rule); People v. Coslet, 67 Ill. 2d
127, 133, 364 N.E.2d 67, 70 (1977). See notes 17-39 and accompanying text infra.
15. People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d at 303-04, 385 N.E.2d at 657 (1978), quoting Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. at 76.
16. People v. Coslet, 67 111. 2d at 133, 364 N.E.2d at 70. See also notes 17-39 and accom-
panying text infra.
17. 40 Il1. 2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441 (1968). The per se rule is not solely an Illinois creation.
It is an application of the presuimption of prejudice utilized by the United States Supreme
Court in its multiple representation case Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). See note
2 supra. The Stocal court relied upon United States v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 55 (E. I). Pa. 1966),
a case that applied the Glasser presumption to a situation in which defense counsel also rep-
resented the victim of the crime in a civil suit.
18. In Stoval, the court stated:
The Constitution assures a defendant effective representation by counsel whether
the attorney is one of his choosing or court-appointed. Such representation is lack-
ing, however, if counsel, unknown to the accused and without his knowledgeable
assent, is in a duplicitous position where his full talents-as a vigorous advocate
having the single aim of acquittal by all means fair and honorable-are hobbled or
fettered or restrained h commitments to others.
40 I11. 2d at 111-12, 239 N.E.2d at 443, quoting Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461, 463 (5th
Cir. 1962). There is also a constitutional right to counsel in Illinois. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
19. 40 Ill. 2d at 113, 239 N.E.2d at 443.
20. Id. These circumstances may also pose an ethical dilemo ma fior an attorney, A vigorous
examination of the attorney's civil client might violate the ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1977). Canon 4 requires the attorney to preserve the confidences and secrets
of a client. See People v. Drysdale, 51 Ill. App. 3d 667, 366 N.E.2d 394 (5th Dist. 1977)
(defense counsel represented prosecution witness in involuntarv coim itmcnt proceeding, a
proper suiject for impeachment).
PEOPLE V. FIFE
court reasoned that this situation is so "fraught with the dangers of prejudice
...which the cold record might not indicate- 21 that a showing of prejudice
should not be required. 22
In addition to protecting the accused against the harmful effects of an
actual conflict of interest, the presumption of prejudice 23 was designed to
protect defense attorneys. It frees defense counsel from having to defend
against charges of disloyalty. 24 The court considered this policy objective
important because it is virtually impossible to determine whether defense
counsel is affected, at least subliminally, by a conflict. 25
Excepting cases involving the multiple representation of defendants, 26 the
Illinois Supreme Court has applied the per se rule in only three other deci-
sions prior to Fife. In People v. Meyers, 27 the court applied the rule to a
situation in which the defense attorney and his civil client had a financial
interest in the length of the defendant's sentence. The defendant pleaded
guilty to burglary charges. Before the plea was entered, however, his court-
appointed counsel agreed to represent the defendant's wife in a possible
dramshop suit against the tavern at which the defendant imbibed prior to
the burglary. 28 Because the wife would be deprived of Meyer's support
during his imprisonment, her damages in the suit would probably increase
21. 40 II. 2d at 113, 239 N.E.2d at 443, quoting United States v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. at 57.
22. Since Stoval, other jurisdictions have held that effective assistance is denied when de-
fense counsel also represents the victim. See Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1974);
State v. Aguilar, 87 N.M. 503, 536 P.2d 263 (1975).
23. The court did not use the term "presumption" in Stoval, but has used that term on
other occasions to describe the operation of the per se rule. See People v. Franklin, 75 Il. 2d
173, 176, 387 N.E.2d 685, 686 (1979). It is open to question whether the prosecution can rebut
the presumption hv demonstrating that the error was harmless. Ehrmann, The Per Se Conflict
of Interest Role in Illinois, 66 ILL, B.J. 578, 581 (1978).
24. People v. Stoval, 40 111. 2d at 113, 239 N.E.2d at 444.
25. Id. See note 63 and accompanying text infra.
26. The court has been cautious in applying the per se rule in multiple representation cases.
It has determined that multiple representation is not per se unconstitutional. People v. Vriner,
74 Ill. 2(d 329, 340, 385 N.E.2d 671, 675 (1978). Although the court has not demanded a
showing of prejudice in those cases, the court has required a showing of an actual conflict of
interest that was manifested at trial. Id. at 341, 385 N.E.2d at 676. See People v. Echols, 74 111.
2d 319, 385 N.E.2d 644 (1978) (public defender representing appellant and co-defendant
exploited fingerprinting officer's confusion of defendants, whereas independent counsel would
have shown prints at burglary were not appellant's); People v. Ware, 39 Ill. 2d 66, 233 N.E.2d
421 (1968) (pre-Stoval case in which defendant sought acquittal while co-defendant pled guilty
and testified against him).
27. 46 I1. 2d 149, 263 N.E.2d 81 (1970).
28. Id. at 150-51, 263 N.E.2d at 82. The Illinois Liquor Control Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
43, § 135 (1977) provides:
Every person who is injured in person or property hy an intoxicated person, has
a right of action ... against any person who by selling or giving alcoholic liquor
causes the intoxication Of such person. . . . An action shall lie for injuries to means
of support caused by an intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication.
1980]
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with the length of her hushand's sentence. 29 Tile attornev shared the wife's
financial interest because the suit was for a contingent fee. 30
The court expanded its per se rule in People v. Kester. 31 In that case, the
assistant public defender had previously appeared in the case for the pros-
ecution as an assistant state's attorney. 32 The court found a per se violation
even though the defense attorney presumably had no continuing commit-
ments to the State's Attorney's Office similiar to the continuing commit-
mients to clients found in Stoval and Meyers. 33 The court justified this ex-
pansion beyond cases involving a continuing commitment by reasoning that a
per se conflict arose from the possible reluctance of the attorney to attack his
own pleadings or question the prosecutorial decisions or actions in which he
was involved. 34 The court also placed heavy emphasis upon tile policy ob-
jective of' avoiding situations that could give rise to unfounded accusations of'
disloyalty. .3
The most recent application of' the per se rule prior to Fife was in People
v. Co.slet. 36 In Cos'let, counsel appointed to represent a defendant charged
with murdering her husband also represented the administrator of the hus-
band's estate. 37 In his role as attorney for the administrator, counsel had
the duty to conserve and distribute estate assets. Since a murdering heir
cannot inherit, a conflict arose because the estate might be enriched by a
conviction. 38
By the time Fife reached the supreme court, these four cases had clearly
established a rule presuming prejudice from conflicts of interest in appointed
counsel. .9 Conflicts occurred in two types of cases. In Stoval, Meyers, and
29. 46 Ill. 2d at 151, 263 N.E.2d at 82. Courts have allowed recovery for support lost when
the intoxicated person was imprisoned for committing a crime. Appleman, Civil Liability Under
the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 34 ILL. L. REV. 30, 33 (1939). See, e.g., Brown v. Moudy, 199 I11.
App. 85, 87 (4th Dist. 1916) (plaintiff's husband jailed after shooting and killing a man in a "fit
of intoxication").
30. 46 Ill. 2d at 150, 263 N.E.2d at 82.
31. 66 Ill. 2d 162, 361 N.E.2d 569 (1977).
32. Id. at 164, 361 N.E.2d at 570.
33. Id. at 167, 361 N.E.2d at 571.
34. Id. at 167-68, 361 N.E.2d at 572. On the other hand, the court has found no conflict
where defense counsel once prosecuted the defendant on a previous charge. See People v.
Franklin, 75 111. 2d 173, 387 N.E.2d 685 (1979). The court has also found no conflict in a case in
which defense counsel had served as head of the County State's Attorney's Criminal Division
while the case was being prepared, but was not active in the prosecution of the defendant. See
People v. Newberry, 55 111. 2d 74, 302 N.E.2d 34 (1973).
35. 66 I11. 2d at 168, 361 N.E.2d at 572.
36. 67 I11. 2d 127, 364 N.E.2d 67 (1977).
37. Id. at 131-32, 364 N.E.2d at 69.
38. Id. at 134, 364 N.E.2d at 70. Under Illinois law, an heir who murders an ancestor is
barred from inheriting the ancestor's property. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, § 2-6 (1977).
39. There is still question as to whether the per se rule applies with equal force to retained
counsel. While general formulations of the rule have not drawn a distinction between appointed
and retained counsel, the court has repeatedly explained that it employs greater scrutiny to
conflicts of interest in appointed counsel. See People v. Coslet, 67 I11. 2d at 133, 364 N.E.2d at
[Vol. 29:585
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Coslet the court found various conflicts, including financial, arising out of the
attorneys" commitments to clients whose interests were opposed to a vigor-
ous defense of the accused. In Kester, the court found a conflict arising out
of the defense attorney's prior involvement with the prosecution in a case
that may have left him reluctant to defend his client forcefully.
THE PER SE RULE IN FiFE: RATIONALE AND ANALYSIS
Facts and Rationale
Gregory Fife was convicted of unlawfd delivery of cannabis 4 0 by a Menard
County jury.4 ' His court-appointed counsel was a special assistant attor-
ney general limited to handling workmen's compensation cases for state
employees. 42 Fife did not waive any conflict of interest resulting from the
attorney's position as a special assistant. 4 The supreme court reversed the
conviction and held that a per se conflict of interest exists when a special
70; People v. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d at 113, 239 N.E.2d at 444. In a recent multiple representation
case, for example, the court distinguished the set of facts before it from the per se decisions on
the ground that "all [the court's per se] cases involved appointed counsel, rather than retained
counsel as here, demanding even closer scrutiny for conflicting interests." People v. Berland, 74
Ill. 2d at 303, 385 N.E.2d at 656. But see People v. Vriner, 74 Ill. 2d 329, 339-40, 385 N.E.2d
671, 675 (1978) (the fact that counsel is retained does not end the inquiry for a conflict of
interest). It is unclear whether the per se rule is solely a product of that closer scrutiny.
The court has not explained why it more closely scrutinizes conflicts in appointed counsel,
but the reason may lie in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The right to
counsel was applied to the states through the due process clause. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963). The fourteenth amendment, however, prohibits only states from denying
due process. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The requisite state action is clearly present when
the state appoints counsel with conflicting interests. When counsel is retained, on the other
hand, state action is not so apparent. When conflicts of interest have appeared in retained
counsel, courts have considered whether the conflicts rendered the trials fundamentally unfair.
Under these circum stances, state action has been found in the court's pronouncing judgment in
an unfair trial. United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1978). This distinction
has led some courts to apply a presumption of prejudice for conflicts in appointed counsel,
while requiring a showing of actual prejudice when counsel is retained. See Harrison v. State,
552 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. Crim. 1977).
Illinois appellate courts, however, have applied the per se rule to retained counsel, although
they did not discuss the state action issue. See People v. Drysdale, 51 I11. App. 3d 667, 366
N.E.2d 394 (5th Dist. 1977) (defense counsel represented prosecution witness in an involuntary
commitment proceeding); People v. Cross, 30 111. App. 3d 199, 331 N.E.2d 643 (4th Dist. 1975)
(first case to apply the per se rule to special assistant attorneys general).
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56-1/2, § 705 (d) (1975).
41. 76 Ill. 2d at 420, 392 N.E.2d at 1346.
42. Id.
43. The record did not indicate the results of a circuit court evidentiary hearing on the issue
of waiver. The attorney claimed that she informed Fife of her status, but Fife testified to the
contrarv. On oral argument, however, the Attorney General conceded that Fife did not waive
an), right to counsel free of the conflict. Id.
1980]
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assistant, or a member of a firn employing a special assistant, serves as
criminal defense counsel without the defendant's knowledgeable waiver of
the conflict of interest. 44
After reviewing the history of the per se rule in Illinois, the court deter-
mined that this holding was required by its previous per se decisions and its
desire to safeguard the right to effective assistance of counsel. " Specifi-
cally, the court indicated concern about the effect of "possible, perhaps sub-
liminal pressure" a special assistant might receive fiom the Attorney Gener-
al's office. 46 The court maintained that the Attorney General shared this
concern because the Code of Conduct for special assistants permitted criminal
defense work only after receiving the client's written waiver of the possible
conflict of interest. 47 Although the court was alarmed at the possibility of
pressure from the Attorney General, it noted that special assistants are en-
gaged in non-criminal work, wholly unrelated to their private employment as
practicing attorneys. 48 This offsetting factor led the court to conclude that
full disclosure accompanied by knowing, eflective waiver "nullified or sig-
nificantly lessened" the problem. 49
Regarding the retroactivity question, however, the court presented less
rationale to support its holding to apply Fife only prospectively. Quoting a
passage from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Stovall v.
Denno,50 it indicated that public policy requires a court to give the litigants
the benefit of a new rule regardless of whether the rule will operate prospec-
tivelv or retroactively. 5 1 On this ground the court promptly reversed Fife's
conviction. The court, however, declined to present the reasoning underly-
ing its decision to deny full retroactive effect to the per se holding.52
44. 76 111. 2d at 424, 392 N.E.2d at 1348. Fife employs general language, appearing to
restrict both appointed and retained counsel. There is some question, however, whether the
per se rule applies to retained counsel. See note 38 supra.
45. 1d.
46. Id. at 424-25, 392 N.E.2d at 1348. Counsel argued that "subconscious conflicts" could
arise because a vigorous defense at trial might antagonize the prosecutor and make the Attorney
General's job more difficult on appeal. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 7.
47. 76 I11. 2d at 421, 424, 392 N.E.2d at 1346-48.
48. Id. at 425, 392 N.E.2d at 1348.
49. Id.
50. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Note; Stovall v. Denno should not be confused with the Illinois per
se decision of People v. Stoval, 40 II1. 2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441 (1968).
51. In Stovall v. Denno, the Court held that United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967),
and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), which found a right to counsel at lineups, had
only Prospective effect. Despite the prospectivitv holding, the Court in Stovall v. Deoo stated:
Sound policies of decision-making, rooted in the command of Article II of the
Constitution that we resolve issues solely in concrete cases or controversies, and in
the possible effect upon the incentive of counsel to advance contentions requiring a
change in the law, militate against denying Wade and Gilbert the benefit of today's
decisions.
388 U.S. at 301, quoted in People v, Fife, 76 111. 2dk at 425-36, 392 N.E.2d at 1349.
52. When originally filed, the opinion explained that the prospectivity holding was based
upon counsel's good faith, acting without benefit of prior authority. People v. Fife, No. 51423,
[Vol. 29:585
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Critical Analysis of the Conflict of Interest Holding
Although the court in Fife found a constitutional violation when special
assistant attorneys general engage in criminal defense work, it appears for
several reasons that the court was more concerned with remedying an appar-
ent impropriety than avoiding a realistic threat to the right to effective
counsel. First, the per se holding in Fife deviates from the criteria employed
in the court's previous per se decisions. In cases that involved a defense
attorney's relationship with a prosecutorial office, the attorney's personal in-
volvement with the prosecution of the accused was a crucial factor. 53 In
Fife, however, the defense attorney was not involved in criminal prosecu-
tions. Special assistants appointed for civil matters, such as workmen's com-
pensation, owe no duty to the state in the criminal arena and, therefore,
inherent loyalty to the state is unlikely. 54 On the contrary, the attorneys'
loyalty will probably lie with those whom they represent outside their official
capacity, because ultimately the bulk of their clientele will be drawn from
the community.
Although the attorney in Fife was not personally involved with the pros-
ecution, the court maintained that a special assistant is still susceptible to
"possible, perhaps subliminal" pressure from the Attorney General's of-
fice. 55 The court did not, however, offer a definition of subliminal pressure
or explain how this pressure will be exerted. In light of the court's previous
per se opinions providing careful analysis of how the conflict could impede
the attorney's efforts, 56 this paucity of explanation was uncharacteristic.
slip op. at 5 (Il. June 8, 1979). When oficiallv published, this explanation was removed from
the court's opinion, leaving no rationale to support the prospectivity holding. See 76 11. 2d at
425-26, 392 N.E.2d at 1348-49.
53. Compare People v. Kester, 66 Ill. 2d 162, 361 N.E.2d 569 (1977), with People v.
Franklin, 75 III. 2d 173, 387 N.E.2d 685 (1979), and People v. Newberry, 55 Ill. 2d 74, 302
N.E.2d 34 (1973). Kester held that there was a per se conflict when defense counsel formerly
represented the prosecution in the same case. In Franklin, however, the court found no conflict
when the defense attorney had once prosecuted the defendant in a previous case but (lid not
remember that he had done so. In Newberry, defense counsel served as head of the County
State's Attornev's Criminal Division while the case was being prepared, but because he was not
involved in the prosecution of the defendant, the court held that there was no per se conflict.
54. See Professional Ethics Opinion No. 374, 60 ILL. B. J. 664 (1972), which finds nothing
improper about special assistant attorneys general limited to non-criminal cases taking on crimi-
nal defense responsibilities. The Ethics Committee determined that in this situation no actual
conflict of interest exists and a possible conflict could not reasonably be anticipated.
Even after the decision in People v. Cross, 30 I11. App. 3d 199, 331 N.E.2d 643 (4th Dist.
1975), which found a per se conflict, the Ethics Committee refused to alter its position. The
Committee felt that the Cross decision was 'not required bv the principles of professional
ethics." Professional Ethics Opinion No. 572, 66 ILL. B. J. 109, 110 (1977). Because special
assistants represent the state in different matters than those involved in their private employ-
ment, the Committee determined that 'representation of the state is not likely to adversely
affect the exercise of independent professional judgment" in their clients' behalf. Id.
55. 76 Ill. 2d at 424-25, 392 N.E.2d at 1348.
56. See People v. Coslet, 67 Ill. 2(d at 133-34, 364 N.E.2d at 70; People v. Kester, 66 II1. 2d
at 168, 361 N.E.2d at 572; People v. Meyers, 46 I1. 2d at 151, 263 N.E.2d at 82; People v.
Stoval, 40 111 2d at 113, 239 N.E.2d at 443.
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Nevertheless, the court buttressed its position by asserting that the 1978
Code of Conduct for special assistants, prohibiting criminal defense work
without the defendant's waiver of the resulting conflict of interest, 57 reflects
the Attorney General's own concern about possible conflicts of interest. 58
The court's contention, however, may be inaccurate. By 1978, the Attorney
General was confronted with two uncontradicted appellate decisions finding
a per se conflict of interest when special assistants served as criminal defense
counsel. 59 The Code might reflect no more than the case law of the time. 60
Second, the court's position on waiver indicates that it did not consider
prejudice a probable consequence of representation by a special assistant. In
previous per se cases, the court has recognized that the right to counsel free
of the conflict could be waived but sought to discourage the practice by
warning that effective waiver is virtually impossible. 61 The Fife opinion
contains no such admonition. Rather, the court, by asserting that disclosure
and waiver nullify or ameliorate the problem, 62 encouraged the Attorney Gen-
57. 76 III. 2d at 421, 392 N.E.2d at 1346-47.
58. Id. at 424, 392 N.E.2d at 1348.
59. By 1978, when the Code of Conduct was revised, both the first and fourth appellate
districts had applied the per se rule to special assistants. See People v. Pendleton, 52 Ill. App.
3d 241, 367 N.E.2d 196 (1st Dist. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956 (1978); People v. Cross, 30
I1l. App. 3d 199, 331 N.E.2d 643 (4th Dist. 1975).
60. In his brief submitted to the Court in Fife, the Attorney General's position was that "an
attorney's part-time work for the Attorney General in areas unrelated to criminal prosecution
should not prevent that attorney from representing criminal defendants. . . .Any conflicts that
may arise in a stituation such as the case at bar are inevitably more speculative than real." Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellant at 7, 20.
61. In the seminal per se decision, the court explained that "[t]he difficulty in appropriately
advising an accused of this right [to counsel] almost directs that counsel, especially one ap-
pointed, be free from any such conflict." People v. Stoval, 40 I11. 2d at 114, 239 N.E.2d at 444.
Coslet illustrates the virtual impossibility of obtaining an effective waiver of the constitutional
violation arising out of a per se conflict. Although the defendant knew that her attorney also
represented her husband's estate, there was nothing in the record to indicate that she knew the
"subtleties" of the laws of distribution and descent, and the effect her conviction would have on
her right to inherit. Furthermore, there was no indication that she understood the duties of her
attorney to the estate, the fiduciary relationship between the administrator and the heirs, and
other legal and ethical problems involved in the lawyer-client relationship. Therefore, the court
concluded that she did not waive the conflict of interest arising out of the attorney's duties to the
estate of her husband. People v. Coslet, 67 I11. 2d at 135, 364 N.E.2d at 71. Regarding waiver
of constitutional rights see generally Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Care-
ful Analysis, 55 TEx. L. REV. 193 (1977); Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Foreward:
Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1970).
62. The court's unusual readiness to accept waiver of the right to counsel free of the conflict
set forth in Fife is also demonstrated in subsequent cases. In People v. Eddington, 77 III. 2d
41, 394 N.E.2d 1185 (1979), and People v. Lykins, 77 111. 2d 35, 394 N.E.2d 1182 (1979), the
court held that the defendants waived their claims of ineffective assistance due to their attor-
neys' status as special assistants by failing to raise the issue in the trial court. This appears
inconsistent with the court's position in the previous per se cases, which indicated that the
mere failure of the accused to object to representation by an attorney with a conflict of interesl
does not constitute a waiver of the right to effective assistance, even if the defendant is fully
aware of the facts surrounding the possible conflict. See Ehrmann, The Per Se Conflict of In-
terest Rule in Illinois, 66 ILL. B. J. 578, 581 (1978).
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eral to use waiver. If the court considered subliminal pressure an actual
threat to counsel's loyalty, then its position on waiver undermines its desire
to safeguard effective counsel. "Subliminal" means "existing or functioning
outside the area of conscious awareness." 63 If defense counsel is being un-
consciously pressured, it seems improbable that waiver by the accused will
have any curative effect upon the impairment of counsel. The threat to effec-
tive counsel would remain.
Ready acceptance of waiver, along with the decision to deny retroactive
effect of the per se rule, 64 indicate that the court did not perceive this
situation as posing a meaningful threat to the right to counsel. The court was
more concerned with the appearance of impropriety. In this regard, disclo-
sure and waiver will have a curative effect because the defendant will be
apprised of the situation, and the court will be relieved of the burden of
having to search the record for specific instances of prejudice.
The use of the per se rule solely to avoid an apparent impropriety is a
misapplication of the rule as developed by earlier decisions. The rule was
first employed to relieve the defendant of the difficult task of proving prej-
udice in a case fraught with the danger of prejudice. 65  In subsequent
cases, the court was careful to restrict the rule to situations where it be-
lieved that prejudice was a realistic concern. 66 In Fife, the court exceeded
this standard and applied the rule to an impropriety that it did not consider
a likely source of prejudice.
Critical Analysis of the Prospectivity Holding
In a decision such as Fife, promulgating a new constitutional rule, an im-
portant corollary issue is whether the rule should be applied retroactively.
67
63. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2275 (1968).
64. See notes 67-76 and accompanying text infra.
65. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
66. See People v. Franklin, 75 I11. 2d 173, 387 N.E.2d 685 (1979) (no conflict of interest
where defense attorney was not actually aware that he prosecuted the defendant in a previous
case); People v. Newberrv, 55 I11. 2d 74, 302 N.E.2d 34 (1973) (no inherent prejudice when
defense counsel merely served as head of State's Attorney's criminal division while defendant's
case was being prepared and was not active in the prosecution of defendant).
67. At common law, all decisions were applied retroactively. Currier, Time and Change in
Judge Made Latw: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201, 205-06 (1965). As Justice
Holtes wrote, "[j]udicial decisions have had retroactive effect for near a thousand years." Kuhn
v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) (statute subsequently declared unconstitutional is as
inoperative as though never enacted). The common law position rests upon the Blackstonian
concept that judges do tiot proclaim the law but merely discover the already existing law
Under this view, because the law preexists the decision, the decision should have retroactive
effect. See generally Rossum, New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme Court and The Prob-
lem of Retroactivity, 23 EMoRY L.J. 381, 385-89 (1974); Note Retroactivity, 4 MENI. ST. U. L.
REV. (197.1).
Although the United States Supreme Court first applied non-constitutional decisions prospec-
tively as earlv as the mid-nineteenth century, see, e.g., Celpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 175, 205-06 (1863); Havemever v. Iowa Count,, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 294, 303 (1865), pro-
1980]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:585
The United States Supreme Court has employed specific criteria for deter-
mining this issue in criminal procedure decisions. 68 When the Fife pro-
spectivity holding is compared with these criteria, it becomes apparent that
the Illinois court has reached a decision inconsistent with the rationale Lin-
derlying the per se rule.
Initially, the Supreme Court examines the purpose of a new constitutional
rule. 69  That purpose requires a finding for retroactivity if the new rule was
designed to correct a defect at trial that called past guilty verdicts into ques-
tion. 70 By contrast, prospective application is required when the rule is not
designed to promote reliability at trial, but to deter unlawful police conduct
through an exclusionary rule.7 1 In cases between these two extremes, such
as where the rule affects trial accuracy but the likelihood of past unfairness is
slight, the Court weighs the purpose against the degree of reliance upon
past authority and the burden of retrials.72
spectivitv in constitutional decisions is a far more recent phenomenon. In Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Court first departed from its practice of retroactively applying constitu-
tional decisions by prospectively applying the exclusionary rule promulgated in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Linkletter Court held that the Constitution neither requires nor pro-
hibits retroactivity, but that a court should weigh the merits of a decision, and examine its history,
purpose, and effect in determining whether to apply it retroactively. 381 U.S. at 629. See
generally, Note, A La Recherche Du Temps Perdu: Retroactivity and the Exclusionary Rule, 54
N.Y.U.L. RE'. 84 (1979).
68. Frequently, these criteria are listed as a three-pronged test consisting of the purpose of
the new rule, the degree of reliance )y law enforcement on the old rule, and the burden of a
retroactive application on the criminal justice system. See generally, Note, Retroactivity, 4
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 521 (1974).
69. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969). Justice Marshall has stated that pur-
pose is the only criteria the Court has employed; other factors are cited only to support the
Court's decision. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 61 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 679 (1973); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646,
653 (1971). The proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard espoused in In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970), was retroactively applied in Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 205 (1972). The
right to counsel at arraignments required by White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), was ret-
roactively applied in Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968). Also, the sixth amend-
ment rights to counsel at trial and on appeal have been retroactively applied. McConnell v.
Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3 (1968).
A second purpose requiring full retroactivity is found in decisions holding that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 61 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437 (1970), and Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 511 (1973),
which retroactively applied double jeopardy decisions. In these cases, retroactivity was required
because the purpose of the new constitutional rule was to prevent a trial from taking place at
all. Id. at 508-10.
71. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1971) (prospectively applied
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which narrowed the scope of permissible searches
incident to arrest); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 254 (prospectively applied Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which prescribed an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained
through unlawful eavesdropping); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 639-40 (prospectively
applied Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which imposed the exclusionary rule on the states
for fourth amendment violations).
72. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 251. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967). Stovall v. Denno held that United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v.
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The rule in Fife is designed to remove an impediment to the fact-finding
process by ensuring that defense counsel will not be restrained by a conflict
of interest. Under the Supreme Court's criteria, also employed by Illinois to
determine the issue in constitutional decisions, 73 this purpose favors a ret-
roactive application. Only if the court determines that the likelihood of past
unfairness is not substantial can it deny the rule retroactive effect under the
Supreme Court's analysis.
This assessment of prejudice, however, would violate the rationale under-
lying the per se rule. The rule presumes prejudice because a reviewing
court is unable to judge accurately the prejudicial impact of a conflict of
interest. 74  The rule was designed to avoid "nice calculations" of prej-
udice. 75  Despite this principle, the court in Fife set forth a prospectivity
holding that must have been based upon a calculation of insufficient prej-
udice in prior cases.
Because the per se rule rests upon suspicion of potential conflicts of in-
terest, the court should not have refused to question past convictions. In
view of the difficulty of proving actual prejudice, the court has left those
already convicted without an effective remedy for the wrong the court has
described. 76 This lack of concern about the accuracy of past convictions is
firther evidence that the court considered the impropriety arising out of
representation by a special assistant more superficial than substantial.
IMPACT OF FIFE
Fife will have a significant impact on defense attorneys and the Attorney
General. The degree of that impact will depend upon how broadly the deci-
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), had only prospective effect. Wade and Gilbert require the
exclusion of identification evidence obtained by a post-indictment line-up at which the right to
counsel was denied. Although this rule was designed to improve the reliability of identification
evidence, the Court felt that the likelihood of past unfairness was too weak to require retroac-
tive application. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 298-99. See generally, Note, Criminal
Procedure--Photo Identification-Stovall Prospectivity Rule Invoked to Avoid Extension of
Right to Counsel, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1019 (1968).
73. See People v. Ellis, 53 Il1. 2d 390, 292 N.E.2d 728 (1973) (prospectively applied an
Illinois search and seizure decision using Supreme Court's criteria); People v. Williams, 44 III.
2d 334, 255 N.E.2d 385 (1970). See also People v. Hubert, 51 11. App. 3d 394, 366 N.E.2d
909 (1st Dist. 1977); Mertes v. Lincoln Park Fed. Sav. and Loan Assoc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 557,
340 N.E.2d 25 (1st Dist. 1975) (applied same criteria to determine retroactive effect of a civil
decision).
74. See notes 18-22 and accompanying text supra.
75. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
76. Writing for a majority of the United States Supreme Court in a recent multiple rep-
resentation decision, Chief Justice Burger stated:
It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting
from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of
the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the im-
pact of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the
impact of a conflict of interests in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 490-91.
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sion is interpreted. Unless waiver becomes a common phenomenon, even a
narrow interpretation will require several attorneys to choose between serv-
ing as appointed defense counsel and accepting part time employment as
special assistant attorneys general. In 1978, niearly two percent of the regis-
tered attorneys in Illinois were special assistant attorneys general. 77 In nine
counties, one third or more of the registered attorneys were special assist-
ants. 78  Although significant, these figures do not reflect the true impact of
Fife because they do not include law firm affiliations. 79 For example, in
Menard County, where Fife was tried, only three of eleven registered attor-
neys were special assistants in 1978. If law firm affiliations are considered,
however, all eleven would have been excluded from appointed defense work
under the per se rule set forth in Fife. 8 0
These statistics indicate the likely difficulty of obtaining court-appointed
counsel in small downstate counties should local attorneys choose to retain
their status as special assistants. 81 On the other hand, if attorneys sever
their relationships with the Attorney General, the office stands to lose the
pool of local talent on which it has come to depend.
A broader interpretation of Fife would include privately retained counsel
in its per se ban. Although the attorney in Fife was appointed, the general
language of the court's holding could easily support the broader interpreta-
tion. 82 If so interpreted, it seems likely that defense attorneys and their
associates will decline to accept part-time employment by the Attorney Gen-
eral at the risk of injuring their private practice.
Further, the court's rationale may be stretched to include private counsel
retained by state agencies, because they serve only at the pleasure of the
Attorney General and, at least in theory, are subject to the officer's con-
77. Annual Report of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee of the Supreme
Court of Illinois (1978) shows 29,972 registered attornevs either employed, practicing, or resid-
ing in Illinois. Statistics prepared by the administration division of the Attorney General's Office
show that in 1978, 459 attorneys served as special assistants in some capacity. Appendix, Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellant at 19.
78. For example, in Pulaski County, 66.7% of the registered attorneys were special assist-
ants. Other examples are Cumberland: 42.9%, Brown: 43%, Hamilton: 37.5%. Appendix, Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellant at 1-5.
79. The per se rule is also applicable when another attorney in defense counsel's firm is a
special assistant. 76 I11. 2d at 425, 392 N.E.2d at 1348.
80. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, 6 n.4.
81. The impediment to obtaining appointed counsel was one factor leading a panel of fourth
appellate district justices to reject the per se rule for special assistants in People v. Crawford
Distrib. Co., 65 I11. App. 3d at 795, 382 N.E.2d at 1227, aff'd, 78 Ill. 2d 70, 397 N.E.2d 1362
(1979).
82. The court said, "[W]e hold that a conflict of interest exists where defense counsel is a
Special Assistant Attorney General... - (emphasis added). 76 Ill. 2d at 424, 392 N.E.2d at
1348. The court did not expressly state whether it intended to restrict the rule to appointed
counsel; however, it can be argued that the per se rationale applies only to appointed counsel.
See note 39 supra.
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trol. 83 Until the scope of Fife is more clearly delineated in subsequent
decisions, defense attorneys should be wary of any relationship with the
state. They should also disclose any work that they, or their associates, do
for state officers or agencies.
In addition to the direct impact upon attorneys working for the state, Fife
will have important effect as precedent. In Fife, the court applied the per se
rule to a conflict of interest far more remote than in previous cases. 84 Be-
cause of the broad application of the per se rule, the case could be used to
support any conceivable argument of possible subliminal pressure on defense
counsel in a given situation. Rather than minimize unfounded charges of
disloyalty, Fife may increase their frequency. 85
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: A PROCEDURAL RULE
RATHER THAN A CONSTITUTIONAL HOLDING
In Fife, the court could have avoided the inconsistency between its per se
holding and its position on waiver and retroactivity. Analysis of the court's
rationale indicates that the court was more concerned with avoiding an appar-
ent impropriety than with eliminating a realistic threat to effective coun-
sel. 86 Under these circumstances, the court should have avoided its con-
83. By the end of the seventeenth century, the common law attorney general was not only
the king's chief litigator but was advisor to the government by sitting in the House of Com-
mons. See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 463-65 (1924). The Illinois Attorney
General inherited all the powers and duties of that common law officer through the Illinois
Constitution. Under these circumstances, the Attornev General is the sole counsel and advisor
to all Illinois executive officers, boards, commissions, and departments. Fergus v. Russel, 270
I11. 304, 341, 110 N.E. 130, 145 (1915); F.E.P.C. v. Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical
Center, 41 Ill. App. 3d 712, 715, 354 N.E.2d 596, 599 (1st Dist. 1976).
This duty does not require, however, that the Attorney General's staff appear in every suit. Rather,
it is within the common law powers of the office to permit state agencies to retain private counsel
who serve at the pleasure of the Attorney General and subject to his or her control. People v.
Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 I11. 2d 218, 238, 120 N.E.2d 35, 45 (1954). Mere acqui-
escence to an agency's retention of private counsel is sufficient consent by the Attorney General.
F.E.P.C. v. Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 41 I11. App. 3d at 715, 354 N.E.2d
at 599. Because those attornevs serve at the pleasure of the Attorney General, it can be argued
that they too may be restrained by an unwillingness to antagonize the officer, should they
choose to serve as criminal defense counsel.
84. See notes 17-45 supra and accompanying text supra.
85. The court has already begun to restrict the operation of the per se rule. In People v.
Robinson, 79 III. 2d 147, - N.E.2d - (1979), (modified on denial of rehearing, Feb. 1,
1980), the court held that a public defender's office should not be treated as a private law firm
in a conflict of interest analvsis. A conflict of interest that disqualifies one member of a public
defender's office will not similarly disqualify all members. Id. at 158-59. The court reasoned that
it is better to have a skilled public defender represent the accused than appoint outside counsel
who are often unskilled in the practice of criminal law. Id. at 159. This retreat from the broad
application of the per se rule in Fife has met with criticism from public defenders. See THE
NATIONAL Law JOURNAL, Nov. 12, 1979, at 7, col. 1. The court also has refused to apply the
per se rule to a public defender who, while representing a defendant in a post-conviction hear-
ing, alleged that his predecessor in office rendered ineffective assistance to the defendant. See
People v. Walton, 78 I11. 2d 197, 399 N.E.2d 588 (1979).
86. See notes 53-76 and accompanying text supra.
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stitutional holding and promulgated a non-constitutional procedural rule
based solely on policy grounds. 87
The Supreme Court of California in People v. Rhodes"8 considered an
impropriety analogous to the problem of defense work by special assistants.
In Rhodes, a city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities was appointed
to represent a criminal defendant. The court found this appointment im-
proper and reversed the conviction, holding that a city attorney could not rep-
resent a criminal defendant.89 Although Rhodes argued that he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel, the court avoided the constitutional is-
sue. 90 Instead, the court promulgated its holding as a judicially-declared
rule of criminal procedure. 9'
A similar approach would have been appropriate in Fife. The court could
have set forth a procedural rule prohibiting judges from appointing special
assistant attorneys general as defense counsel without the defendant's in-
formed consent to the appointment. The rule would be grounded solely in
the policy objective of removing an apparent impropriety. It would both
remove a cause of anxiety for the accused and minimize unfounded charges
of disloyalty. 92
The rule should be restricted to appointed counsel because the apparent
impropriety is more visible when the court appoints a special assistant to
represent the accused. This restriction is also in keeping with the greater
87. Each state is free to promulgate its own rules of criminal procedure. Spencer v. Texas,
385 U.S. 554, 569 (1967); United States v. Pate, 406 F.2d (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 938 (1970). The Illinois Supreme Court has the inherent power to make rules governing
the practices in inferior courts, including regulation of jury trials. People v. Lobb, 17 111. 2d
287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959). These procedural rules cannot alter substantive rights. In re
Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971). However, they carry the effect of law when promulgated
by the supreme court. Jones v. Reuss, 70 I11. App. 2d 418, 219 N.E.2d 754 (1966).
88. 12 Cal. 3d 180, 524 P.2d 363, 115 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1974).
89. Id. at 187, 524 P.2d at 368, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
90. Id. at 187, n. 13, 524 P.2d at 368, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
91. Id. at 185, 524 P.2d at 366, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 238. The Rhodes court reasoned that even it
counsel's Ioyalt, is unaffected hy his or her prosecutorial responsibilities, public confidence in the
criminal justice system is shaken by the apparent impropriety of the situation. id. at 186, 524 P.2d at
367, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
92. These policy factors have also influenced the court in its per se decisions. See, e.g.,
People v. Stoval, 40 111. 2d 109, 113, 239 N.E.2d 441, 444 (1968). These same considerations
led the appellate court in People v. Fife to conclude that the per se rule exists to protect the
accused from actual conflicts of interest as well as the anxiety caused by the mere appearance of
dual allegiance. 65 I11. App. 3d 805, 807, 382 N.E.2d 1234, 1236 (4th Dist. 1975), affd 76 Ill.
2d 418, 392 N.E.2d 1345 (1979).
Other state courts have recognized the importance of avoiding apparent impropriety. For
example, the South Dakota Supreme Court has noted:
There is a very real need to assure defendants in particular and the public in
general that justice is in fact being administered fairly and impartially in all criminal
cases. The courts can take one small step toward this goal by foreclosing in as many
cases as possible those situations which might result in conflicts of interest, either
apparent or real, and resultant claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. Erickson, 85 S.D. 489, 499, 186 N.E.2d 502, 507, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971).
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scrutiny that the court applies to appointed counsel. 93  Apart from the
proposed rule, retained counsel remain ethically required to disclose any
contrary personal interests to a client 9 4 and to avoid the appearance of im-
propriety. 95
Further, the procedural rule provides the same curative elements of dis-
closure and consent that the court emphasized in the constitutional holding.
In this context, however, they do not assume the appearance of encouraging
the waiver of the right to counsel. 96  Also, the rule's purpose will favor
prospective application because the procedural rule rests upon a policy deci-
sion to avoid the appearance of impropriety, rather than on a constitutional
violation. The procedural decision would be similar to the United States
Supreme Court's exclusionary rule decisions that are uniformly applied pro-
spectively: the accuracy of the trial is not questioned, but the rule is de-
signed to deter future improper governmental conduct. Despite a prospec-
tive application, the court could still reverse Fife's conviction for the same
reasons as in the constitutional decision. 98
Finally, the procedural rule avoids the harsh impact of the per se ban.
Because the rule would be restricted to appointed counsel, attorneys are less
likely to sever their relationships with the Attorney General and other state
officers and agencies. By avoiding the constitutional holding, the court
would have refrained from applying the per se rule to a case where the
conflict is far more remote than in other per se cases. That limitation would
reduce the untoward legal impact of Fife as precedent for any conceivable
argument involving subliminal pressure in a given instance. Additionally, the
procedural approach provides the court with the flexibility to deal with appar-
ent improprieties solely at the public policy level. The court would remain
free to employ the per se rule to the type of situation that fostered the rule:
a case "fraught with the dangers of prejudice which the cold record might
not indicate." 99
CONCLUSION
People v. Fife forces Illinois attorneys doing part-time work for the Attor-
ney General's office to make a choice. These attorneys must sever their rela-
tionships with the Attorney General or limit their criminal defense work to
93. See note 38 supra.
94. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, D.R. 5-101 (A).
95. Id. Canon 9. Ethics Opinion No. 572, stating that the per se rule for special assistants
was not required by the principles of professional ethics, still encouraged disclosure in this
situation to avoid the appearance of impropriety. 66 ILL. B.J. 109, 110 (1977).
96. The Fife court's emphasis on the curative aspect of waiver appears to encourage its use.
See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
97. See note 71 supra.
98. See note 51 supra.
99. People v. Stoval, 40 I11. 2d at 112-13, 239 N.E.2d at 443, quoting United States v.
Myers, 253 F. Supp. at 57. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
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cases in which they can obtain knowing and effective waiver of the resulting
conflict of interest. If interpreted very broadly, Fife also will affect attorneys
doing work for state administrative agencies and other state officers. If spe-
cial assistants choose to continue their part time government employment,
the decision could have a detrimental impact on the availability of appointed
defense counsel in small downstate counties.
Although the per se holding in Fife probably will go unchallenged, 100 the
decision is still likely to stimulate litigation. Because the court applied the
per se rule to a potential conflict of interest far more remote than in previ-
ous cases, it will be required to consider the extent of the per se rule in
subsequent cases. To avoid overextension of the rule, the court should pre-
sent more detailed analysis in future per se cases, and should employ the
non-constitutional procedural rule approach whenever possible.
Stanley C. Nardoni
100. The Attorney General has not petitioned the United States Supreme Court for cer-
tiorari. His decision may have been influenced by the Court's recent denial of certiorari to
People v. Pendleton, 52 Ill. App. 3d 241, 367 N.E.2d 196 (1st Dist. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 956 (1978), which had found a per se conflict when special assistants engage in criminal
defense work.
Even though Fife is not likely to be reviewed bv the United States Supreme Court, the
conflict of interest question may reach the lower federal courts. Those prosecuted for offenses
occurring before the Fife opinion was filed were not given the benefit of the court's holding.
They remain free to seek habeas corpus relief on the conflict of interest ground. Their success
would be doubtfl in the seventh circuit, since the court of appeals requires a showing of
prejudice unless counsel's conflict of interests relates to the result of the case or permeates it
entirelv. United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038, 1044 (7th Cir. 1976). See United States v.
Kidding, 560 F.2d 1303, 1311 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977) (because no
prejudice resulted, joint representation of clients with conflicting defenses did not violate right
to counsel); United States v, Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066
(1976) (prosecution witness was defense counsel's former client, but no constitutional violation
occurred because record did not evidence divided loyalty).
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